

What is youth work going to look like in the near future? Much the same as it has in the recent past, according to **Scott Poynting** and **Rob White**. Youth workers will still have to confront the challenges of dealing with the ambiguity of the label ‘at risk’ and also the expectation that they will take on the soft cop role. Using the example of young Lebanese Australians in Western Sydney, the authors suggest that young people are creating identities that don’t fit the stereotypes. The challenge for youth workers is, therefore, to step outside their own stereotypes and practice forms of youth work that are relevant to a new generation of young people.



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YOUTH WORK

Challenging the soft cop syndrome

This paper begins with the premise that there are fundamental structural continuities that make the basic challenges for youth work in the next decade much the same as those of the last several decades. Specifically, the core tasks of youth work and the key targets of youth work, and political conflicts over these, are as contentious today as they were in the 1960s. Yet historical changes and conjunctural circumstances mean that the tensions within youth service provision present themselves in a new guise, with unique and original problems for youth workers to confront in the new millennium.

In particular, much youth work has, and will continue, to grapple with notions of “youth at risk” and the politics surrounding these as guides to practical action. To illustrate the dilemmas and choices for youth workers, examples are given from recent research among second-generation immigrant youth in Sydney and Melbourne. With whom youth workers end up working, and how, specifically, they do so, will undoubtedly be significantly affected by major social, economic and political changes. If we are to adequately understand the challenges facing youth workers, then we need to analyse wider social devel-

opments that affect and involve diverse groups of young people.

What happens in the world of the young people who are the subjects of youth work will inevitably shape the youth work mission into the future. It is also essential to consider how youth work as an occupation and as a social practice is situated in terms of workplace contexts, institutional ideologies and agency dynamics. Being a “worker” with “youth” implies a dialectic between specific occupational circumstance and particular sorts of service provision, a relationship that warrants close attention.

The daily challenges for youth work have always involved extending material and social resources to young people, particularly those who are disadvantaged, marginalised and socially excluded. For those of us interested in social justice, the perennial challenge is how to achieve this, while mitigating the most deleterious effects of the social control function of youth work. Broadly speaking, the political orientation of such youth work incorporates radical forms of advocacy and collective youth empowerment, rather than relying upon a treatment model or conservative advocacy approach that implies that the role of youth work is simply to do something for and on behalf of young people (see Cooper & White 1994; Wong 2004).

Corney (2003) finds the values of degree-level youth work courses in Australia to be left of centre and advocating empowerment, community development, equity and so on. The challenge is how to defend such cultural politics when their practitioners are insecure, given the hostile relations of forces arising from a period of economic rationalism and the vulnerable occupational location of the profession. To put it differently, upon leaving the academy, where do youth workers end up? How does the objective position of youth workers – as employees of local councils, state governments, charity organisations, state-funded non-government agencies and so on – impact upon and shape their work activities? How does public consternation regarding management of the “underclasses” and the new urban “dangerous” classes shape the government, the agency, and the youth worker agenda? (See White 1994.) For many youth workers, the actual doing of youth work constantly involves juggling how best to provide services needed by young people, while avoiding the role of “soft cops” (White 1990, pp.165-88). There are many factors that can influence the dynamics and outcomes of this juggling act. Youth work, as a social practice, does not operate in an institutional and ideological vacuum.

For instance, broadly speaking, there is a contradiction between the egalitarian, redistributive, welfare-state moments of youth work, and the repressive, disciplining and controlling moments of the fundamentally inegalitarian late-capitalist state, whose contemporary neo-liberal regime has wound back the welfare aspects. This contradiction is neatly encapsulated in the opposed meanings of the notion “at risk”, so much a stock in trade of youth work and educational discourse. Given finite resources and practical fiscal limitations, youth work, even more than education, has had to target its services to focus on the sectors of the youth population that are identified as most in need of them. The “youth” clientele of “youth work” has never been all young people en bloc, nor could or should it be. The label “at risk” is one way of selecting those requiring special attention. It is also the fulcrum of the basic ideological and strategic tensions that lie at the core of youth work practice.

For example, Irving, Maunders and Sherington (1995), in examining youth policy from the 1940s to the early 1990s, show the twofold aims of the state as being to protect society and to develop future leaders of society. The class dimension is central here. To protect means to protect from the unruly elements of working-class youth and their possible disruption to the established order. Future leaders, on the other hand, must be recruited and groomed from the middle strata and the respectable working class: the “aspirational” of recent poll-political wisdom. Who youth workers work with, and why, has never been far removed from issues of class struggle and class politics.

Risk and youth work

What does the label “at risk” mean? At one level, it identifies those who are in danger of becoming or remaining marginal, socially excluded, kept at a disadvantage. Often they already are. We don’t want to denigrate the usefulness of this term. The risks to young



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people thus labelled can be very real and potentially devastating: death from overdose, severely impaired health, injury from violence, psychological damage from abuse, the suffering of incarceration, and so on. The task of the youth worker here, from our perspective, is to ameliorate the worst aspects of institutional humiliation and denigration, and to proactively work toward individual and collective empowerment. This necessarily is a social change agenda, oriented toward changing society at the same moment as enhancing the ability of young people to act on their own behalf.

On the other hand, “at risk” seems to connote those who are perceived to constitute a risk to the so-called community, to good public order, that in turn is presumed to be based on a common set of values and interests. Dealing with this risk, “gentling the masses”, whether by pastoral or more forceful means, has been a central task of the state since the coming into being of the dangerous classes, that blind giant that could otherwise get out of control and wreak havoc. This sense of risk is not of endangered human needs of vulnerable individuals. Rather, it is of threat to the maintenance of the established order, to the interests of those privileged within it, to property, to accumula-

tion. Historically, youth work has been called upon to play a prominent role in the pursuit of this agenda – namely, to clean the streets of wayward youth and to civilise the recalcitrants of the urban underclasses (see Maunders 1984). The governance of risk has also permeated the social institutions with which young people have most contact.

There are three basic forms of institution that shape the everyday life of young people: coercive, developmental and commercial (Cunneen & White 2002). For example, the coercive includes police, courts and detention centres; the developmental includes schools and families; and the commercial includes shopping centres and game arcades. The coercive institutions necessarily involve negative labelling of young people, targeting them for social control. Sometimes the label becomes integral to the identity of certain young people, a badge of honour, a symbol of resistance, in a cyclical and often escalating process of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Developmental institutions, on the other hand, affix positive labels as well as negative ones. They, therefore, comprise both negative and positive social processes, such as school success or alienation, and family as a safe haven or site of child abuse. While developmental institutions may entail certain compulsion (such as compulsory school attendance), they operate mainly through “consent” instead of “coercion” (Cunneen & White 2002). It is important, however, to stress, as Gramsci (1971, pp.263, 266) did, that these two moments are always present in hegemony, which is, as he put it, consent “protected by the armour of coercion”. Just as schools also have a coercive function, according to Gramsci, so jails have an educative or pedagogical function. There is no neat line separating ideological apparatuses from repressive apparatuses, developmental possibilities from oppressive realities. Generally speaking, however, positive experiences for a young person in any one developmental institution usually

means he or she is at the same time located in a network of support provided by a number of such institutions (White 2004). This benefit is not evenly distributed in our society, and herein lies a key challenge. The pattern of distribution is closely related to the process of identifying who is or who isn’t “at risk”.

Commercial institutions similarly can confer on youth both positive and negative labels. Young people participating in these institutions may adopt certain “consumer-related identities” (White 2004). Or, as non-consumers, they may be branded undesirable or “troublemakers”. Because of their amenity, their occupation of considerable physical space, and because of their function as a meeting place, young people usually see commercial institutions like shopping centres as significant places to hang out and to socialise in. Yet services provided to youth by commercial institutions are delimited by the imperatives of profit. This provides two challenges: first, to deal with young people as actual and potential consumers and thus meet the needs of youth culture by providing attractive environments for their buying of goods and services. Second, to maintain the comfort and security within the institution, of all customers – including young people – so as to obviate any possible threats to the realising of profits there. It is clear that these considerations, and indeed the amenity of such commercial institutions, are not extended equitably to all users, including most notably, all young people. Some are much more likely to be labelled as a risk to profit, rather than a means to it.

Critical analyses have shown how the privatisation of public space impinges upon those young people who are most marginal to the buying of commodities and hence to the realisation of profit that is central to these sites (White 1990; Crane & Dee 2001). In response, various strategies have been proposed to advance the interests of such young people in this environment (Crane 2000; White 1998). Yet empirical studies, such as

those of Robinson (1999) and Pinkstone (2003), have shown how the contradictions involved set real limits to what can be achieved.

But risk is itself also “achieved” through the agency of young people themselves. Think of how the English “lads” of Paul Willis (1977) proudly adopted the school’s identification of them as factory fodder, and how their culture reversed values accorded officially by the institution to, for example, manual and mental labour. Working-class masculinity in Australia has, likewise, always embodied elements of hostility towards schooling, and towards police (Cunneen 1985; Irving, Maunders & Sherington 1995). In a similar vein, Connell (1995) has made profound analyses of “protest masculinity”, which provide a theoretical challenge for those practising youth work. Whether it be education, welfare, criminal justice or health systems, an important question to ask is the extent to which the particular ways in which state agencies target young people, especially young men, create the very sorts of problems they are deployed to address.

Poynting, Noble and Tabar (2003), for example, have found a sort of “ethnic” protest masculinity among second-generation immigrant young men, which is implicated in these sorts of social reproduction and social control. Presented as being “at risk” (of offending, of being poor, of being marginalised) – basically, as dangers to the wider Australian community – state intervention has tended in this instance to be directed at containment and control. In response, the targets of intervention, the young people themselves, deploy their own strategic means to gain status, identity and security, often through the form of “gangs” and aggressive physicality. The very mode in which marginalised people contest social power thus re-creates and confirms the public image of deviance, dangerousness and difference. By their own actions, they feed the machine of state repression (see White & Perrone 2001; Collins et al.

2000). So what is the role of the youth worker in these circumstances?

Hard cops and soft cops

Collins et al. (2000) investigated some of these challenges in relation to immigrant youth in Western Sydney. They traced a series of moral panics over so-called “ethnic youth gangs” in the working-class, high immigrant population suburbs of south-west Sydney. White et al. (1999) had made a similar study in Melbourne, contrasting the contemporaneous moral panic over “ethnic gangs” with the reality of young people’s lived experiences and culture.

From its well-known early deployment by Stan Cohen (1973), the notion of moral panic has been applied to very particular folk devils among young people. Poynting et al. (2004) argue that, from the mid to late 1990s, the pre-eminent youth folk devil in Australia was groups of young people of (usually) second-generation, immigrant background. With the construction of the “Arab Other”, Arab and Muslim youth came to rival, then supplant, so-called “Asian gangs” in that folk-devil role. The moral panics, fuelled by tabloid and talkback sensationalism, saw these ethnic minority youth and their communities criminalised, and saw crime – especially street crime – racialised.

The state response was a populist complicity in this process of demonisation, and the deployment of its forces of repression in campaigns of so-called “zero tolerance”. The accelerating rounds of press briefings from police spokespeople, comment on talkback radio, statements by parliamentarians and other public figures, letters to the editor, press editorials, were in general of two types: right-wing demands to “clean up the streets”, and a liberal rhetoric about a younger generation of non-English-speaking background immigrants being “caught between two cultures”.

We’ll turn shortly to this second frame. First, however, we should note some particular challenges for (hard cop) zero tolerance type policing of

ethnic minority young people, especially young men. Poynting et al.’s (2004) ethnographic study of high school-aged young Lebanese background men in Western Sydney showed that the youths consciously adopt a strategy of withdrawing respect from, and even confrontation with, authorities perceived as discriminatory as a way of recreating a feeling of manly dignity in the face of what they experience as racist humiliation. This has obvious consequences for that confrontational style of policing, especially when combined with ethnic profiling. Moreover, there is considerable evidence (Collins et al. 2000) of a dynamic of competing masculinities that exacerbates confrontations, unequal though they are, between young male immigrants in public spaces and, very often, young male police. This poses some problems for police training, police–youth liaison, police–ethnic community liaison, and for youth workers.

We also need to consider what amenities have been provided for young people by, for example, local governments, in areas associated with “ethnic crime”, to diminish interactions causing anxiety on the streets. Given institutional racism and general discrimination against disadvantaged young people, what is the relationship between these facilities and these young people? More contentiously, what is the relationship between these service providers and the police? The portrayal in the media of young people generally, and cultural minority (including Indigenous) young people in particular, also presents an ongoing challenge to those who work with them. How might the media purveying of irrational fears, to which populist politicians react, be replaced by genuine and better-informed moves towards more intercultural understanding? How should youth workers intervene in these circumstances?


We turn now to the soft cop version of social control: the example involving the representation and treatment of young second-generation immigrants

as “lost between cultures”. Such representations are often found in popular form in the media, not least during moral panics, but they also have their scholarly counterparts. Their main sources seem to be ethnic community workers and ethnic community leaders, rather than the young people themselves. The account of “loss” is more typically articulated by the first – their parents’ – generation of immigrants. As a 33-year-old male community worker of Lebanese background, himself a parent of three, put it:

The biggest problem would be a generation gap, there is a big backlash because of the generation gap and secondly you’ve got two cultures: like the parents have a culture and the kids have a part of their parents’ culture and also taking on the Australian. So we’ve got new cultures coming up. And the kids are lost, and the problem is an identity crisis. They don’t know who they are, are they Lebanese, are they Australian, are they Arabs, are they Turkish, are they Asians? (Poynting et al. 2004, p.92).

The notion of being caught or lost between cultures involves an ideology of dysfunction, which legitimates state surveillance and intervention. The corrective intervention can be one of enlightenment or forceful containment. In the following quote from another interview, the youth worker’s argument implies the need to educate parents (in the ways of “whiteness” – the dominant culture), or else the children “end up on the streets”, necessitating repression.

There is a big communication breakdown within the home itself. The father doesn’t see his son much because he is always busy and the father doesn’t understand his son’s culture. He wants him brought up the way he was brought up by his uncles, so there are always cultural differences at home and a communication breakdown. They don’t talk to each other much, not like the way they should be talking to each other. If my own son has a problem, by rights he should approach me and I should be there to support him



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and help him out. Otherwise he will be looking for somebody else to be comfortable with and this is why they all end up on the streets (community worker, female, 36 years, herself a parent of four) (Poynting et al. 2004, p.93).

Spokesperson for the Lebanese Muslim Association, Richard Mitre, when interviewed by right-ring commercial radio talkback host Alan Jones, said that Lebanese parents worry about their children losing the best of their tradition. Jones retorted that parents feel that they are not allowed to discipline their children as they see fit. Often depicted in cartoons as a parrot with earphones, Alan Jones was here echoing pronouncements by conservative religious leaders who had complained to *The Australian* newspaper that “the Government doesn’t allow parents to discipline”.

Youth work as listening work

When young people were actually interviewed, they tended to be misheard: a group of young men interviewed by the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper spoke of their solidarity against racism and their demands for mutual respect; the reporters heard and recounted an argument about a “gang” united by “Lebanese blood”. There were commendable exceptions,

of course, such as the documentary on Radio National by Nadya Stani (2000), who interviewed some of the same youths over a year later:

First young man’s voice: *Walter here. Walter’s never hurt an ant in his life; he never hurt anyone in his life but there he’s referred as a big gang member.*

Second young man’s voice: *Because my parents have come from overseas, my parents might be Lebanese and that, but I’ve lost a lot of my heritage, my parents haven’t passed it down to me so therefore I’ve picked up the Australian heritage so therefore – but inside, I might not look it, but I am Australian ...*

If we take the trouble to listen to the young man, he is not saying that he is “lost”, though others may say it of him. He has inherited some Lebanese culture, “lost” some, and “picked up the Australian heritage”. He asserts that he is Australian, while conceding that his physical appearance may lead some to think otherwise. He indicates awareness of the calls in his ethnic community for cultural maintenance, and some sense that he has “lost a lot of ... heritage”. There is also a notion that there is something already defined as the Australian heritage, which he feels that he has “picked up”. He is constructing his identity within the contradictory demands for cultural maintenance and for assimilation to “the” dominant culture. There is no lack of confidence in his partaking in the “Australian heritage”, only an implied resentment that others may call this into question because of how he looks. This is not an idiosyncratic individual case, but an example of a strong pattern encountered again and again among this generation in a series of research projects in Western Sydney since 1996 (Poynting et al. 2004, pp.79-115).

Noble, Poynting & Tabar (1999) have called these cultural manoeuvres “strategic hybridity”. This is almost the opposite of being trapped between cultures; it involves appropri-

ating elements of parents’ homeland culture and the “dominant culture” in creative and quite fluid ways, which shift according to circumstances. What the various hybrid forms share is that they are misread and deprecated both by the traditionalists of their parents’ generation and those of the dominant culture who feel threatened when (only) elements of it are appropriated by “others”, who stubbornly remain Other by refusing to assimilate unconditionally, and who feel just as threatened when other elements of it are rejected, undermining the singularity and exclusivity of what they see as “their” Australian cultural heritage: “one nation” (Poynting et al. 2004, p.97).

The young Lebanese Australians are operating, not “caught”, within a double contradiction. Their parents want them to succeed in the new country. The younger generation knows that this necessarily entails a degree of strategic adoption of dominant cultural forms: what Ghassan Hage (1998) calls “accumulating whiteness”. To the extent that they do this, however, they experience a sense of reproof for abandonment, neglect, disregard or even perhaps betrayal of their parents’ culture and their own origins. On the other hand, to the extent that they become fluent in the dominant cultural idiom, they are never judged to do so enough to attain the equality that they seek. They always do so imperfectly from the point of view of the cultural arbiters; they always have a cultural “accent”, as it were, which serves as a marker and a pretext for discrimination. There is a difference between being lost and being told to “get lost”!

From youth studies that take the trouble to listen to young people themselves, a very different picture emerges. It is one of active agents, making their own culture, albeit in unequal social circumstances not of their own choosing. As proponents of this sort of research, which accords young people their voices and their agency, we want to suggest that perhaps it is through such



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creativity as can be found in their lively, nuanced, struggle-produced culture-in-the-making, that history might be made for the better.

Youth work challenges

Regardless of a widely shared “professional” ideology that is “left liberal” (see Cooper & White 1994; Corney 2003), one can legitimately ask two questions about youth work that pertain to its broad social role – historically, now and into the future.

First, what objective position do youth workers occupy in relation to their immediate employment situation? Who do they work for, how is their workplace structured and what is their official, designated work role? The issue here is how the workplace affects the political orientation and ability of youth workers to put their values into practice. Associated with this, we need to critically evaluate the occupational limits and pressures stemming from multiple demands being placed upon youth workers to engage in “holistic”, community-based risk/protection strategies (see Toumbourou 1999; White 2002). Moreover, what are the implications of being drawn into complex and time-consuming activities that are intended, not so much to change the world, but to address the worst

excesses of unequal distributions of societal resources and alienated youth behaviour? How do we position this kind of work within the philosophical universe of youth workers?

Second, and related to the first concern, how is the subjective attachment to social justice made manifest, concretely, at the level of professional practice and collective politics? In other words, we need to know how presumed “helping” ideologies are being translated into particular workplace and occupational settings – one cannot “read off” the politics of youth work simply from what practitioners say about themselves and their beliefs. We need to base our analysis on what people do, individually and collectively, over a period of time, and for whom, to whom and with whom they are doing it. The issue here is how the value orientation of youth workers shapes their workplace tasks and sense of mission. Any sustained analysis of youth work as a social practice needs to acknowledge that, for example, people linked to, say, the Eureka Youth League (associated with the old Communist Party of Australia), would intervene in quite a different way from those affiliated with a conservative Christian group. The history of youth work is in fact a history of ideological and political conflict and of major divergences within the field itself (see Maunders 1984; White 1990; Wong 2004).

The circumstances that we inherit from the past are inherently changing, and invariably there will be new and evolving challenges for youth work over the next 10 years. Class politics (and, we might add, “ethnic” and gender politics) will, as ever, remain a central feature of where youth work has been, and where it is heading. In our view, the key areas of challenge that will impact upon who youth workers work with and how they do so can be summarised as follows:

Challenges of the youth social environment

It is clear that the present generation of youth, as a whole, engage with the world

in very different ways from previous generations (see White & Wyn 2004). This is apparent in regards to employment patterns, school experiences, perceptions of health, youth presence and use of public spaces, shifting family forms and interactions with the criminal justice system. Issues of inequality and identity are at the core of youth experience, and it is essential for youth workers to understand the social processes lying beneath these, and to creatively respond to rapidly changing social environments. These changes are exacerbated by the economic, social and political impacts of globalisation.

Challenges of the youth work environment

One of the immediate challenges for youth workers has to do with the conditions under which they perform their youth work. Even a cursory examination of workplace environments and grounded practice indicates that many workers are being asked to work harder, with fewer resources, and that they have to deal with increasingly complex policy and inter-agency demands (White 2002). New professional models of practice seem to demand more and more from youth workers in regards to their time, skills, energy and resources. Non-government agencies compete for dwindling funds while facing expanding needs; government agencies struggle with limited resources and tighter regulation of workplace tasks and performance management. How will these shape the actual work practices of youth workers as the pressures mount rather than diminish over time?

Challenges of the youth work mission

The changing social circumstances of youth, and the difficulties associated with youth work as an occupational and social practice, together pose challenges in relation to the social goals of youth work. Essentially, we can well ask how these trends will impact upon the principles of service provision (many of which

make reference to instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child), and the specific values so often associated with youth work provision (such as youth participation and youth empowerment). To put it differently, how will progressive youth workers working in a political and ideological climate that stresses individualistic solutions to social inequalities and disparities, and whose workplaces reflect the pressures and limits of neo-liberal policies, engage in the tasks of building community solidarity, fighting racism and sexism, responding to the crises of masculinity, and so on? Will the politics of social justice and social change give way to the contingent values of pragmatism, thus reinforcing the hard cop versus soft cop tension as the only way in which to construct the youth work mission?

This paper has highlighted some of the problems associated with how “risk” is conceived and responded to in relation to specific groups of young people. We have also tried to indicate that while there is no single practice of youth work as such, there are significant social forces that have the potential to delimit youth work practice in certain ways. Therefore, a crucial challenge for youth work generally, is to continuously create the political and practical spaces within which the widest variety of interventions are made possible. Otherwise, as a social practice, youth work faces the risk of losing its legitimacy among the very young people it purports to serve. This, too, is a challenge.

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Scott Poynting is Associate Professor in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney. Rob White is Professor of Sociology in the School of Sociology, Social Work and Tourism at the University of Tasmania.

Want to be a **YOUTH WORKER?**

Information about degree and graduate courses in Australia

Youth work, as a professional discipline, is often taught in Australia at tertiary level as a major component within Bachelor degrees. In some cases, degree courses require that prospective students apply for entry through a diploma course within that university's TAFE division. Readers wishing to pursue a career in this field should consult individual universities to find out the extent of youth work training offered at various levels. This information is also on the ACYS web site at: www.acys.utas.edu.au/education/ For other sources of course information, consult librarians at your nearest academic library.

New South Wales

University of Western Sydney www.uws.edu.au

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Bachelor of Community Welfare (Youth Work)

Bachelor of Youth Work

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Master Health Science (Child and Adolescent Health)

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Graduate Diploma in Health Studies

Master of Health Studies

Victoria

Australian Catholic University Limited www.acu.edu.au

Bachelor of Social Science (Youth Studies)

RMIT University www.rmit.edu.au

Bachelor of Arts (Youth Affairs)

Bachelor of Social Science (Youth Work)

Master of Education (Youth Development Education)

University of Melbourne www.unimelb.edu.au

Master of Youth, Health, Education & Welfare

Graduate Diploma in Adolescent Health & Welfare

Graduate Diploma in Mental Health Sciences (Child, Adolescent & Family Mental Health)

Victoria University www.vu.edu.au

Bachelor of Arts (Youth Studies)

Western Australia

Edith Cowan University www.ecu.edu.au

Bachelor of Social Science (Youth Work)

Bachelor of Social Science (Youth Work) with Honours

Bachelor of Arts (Education) / Bachelor of Social Science (Youth Health and Physical Activity)

Other post-secondary courses in youth work

In Australia, TAFE colleges provide certificate courses in youth work, such as the Certificate IV in Youth Work. For details of such non-tertiary youth work courses, certificates and diplomas, see the NTIS web site at: www.ntis.gov.au. NTIS also has information about youth worker qualifications and a list of providers of the Diploma of Community Services (Youth Work). Many other courses such as welfare and social work will lead to qualifications which can be used in the youth work field.

Short courses are offered in various States by institutions working in conjunction with a university. For example, in Melbourne, a distance education short course on depression in young people is offered by ORYGEN Youth Health in conjunction with the University of Melbourne.

Faith-based and Christian youth work courses

Examples of these include the Bachelor of Arts (Youth Work) offered by Tabor College. Their Adelaide course is for those wishing to be eligible for employment in faith-based youth work initiatives, such as high school chaplaincy and local church youth worker positions as well as the broader community services youth sector. See: www.adelaide.tabor.edu.au

Also contact YFC Australia, email: youthissues@yfc.org.au

International courses

Examples include: *Commonwealth Youth Programme: Diploma in Youth in Development Work*

For professional youth development workers in over 40 countries of the Commonwealth. See web site at: www.thecommonwealth.org/cyp

UNESCO

The World Assembly of Youth, in conjunction with UNESCO, at times conducts a Certificate in Youth Studies program. See the TakingITGlobal web site at: www.takingitglobal.org/opps/event.html?eventid=3019